Mapping the network society: Network dynamics in the transition to democracy in Indonesia

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Abstract

We make transparent the mutually reinforcing relationships between global civil society, democracy and network society, which are often implicit in extant theories. The concept of a 'global civil society' cannot be separated from the promotion of democracy. Global civil society itself is one of the most explicit instances of the emergence of network society in the modern age and democracy lies at the very heart of what constitutes a network society. However, very little has been said about how these apparent mutually reinforcing relationships came about. Focusing on the case of Indonesia during the fraught regime change from authoritarianism to democracy, we investigate the role of transnational and national civil society organisation during the periods of pre-reform, reform and post-reform. Using multi-methods, including social network analysis and interviews with civil society activists and networkers, we discover a less encouraging picture of these relationships and conclude that the forging of this virtuous circle has some obvious gaps. We try to account for these apparent gaps in this mutually reinforcing relationship in terms of different modes of political participation. We suggest that some forms of 'chequebook activism' characterised the global civil society role during an abrupt and bloody regime change.

1.   Introduction

Global civil society, democracy and network society are often mentioned in the same breath and their relationships are mostly seen to be mutually reinforcing. Yet scholars have noted some potential problems that might be embedded within such relationships. For instance, there are concerns about civil society organisations (CSOs) and their accountability (Edwards and Hulme, 1995, 1997), democracy that does not seem to be effective any longer in bringing about development (Fung and Wright, 2001) and the account of network society and the tensions it brings that may result in increasing isolation and fragmentation (Silverstone, 1996).

Despite these concerns, however, essentially one can see that there is a virtuous relationship between global civil society, democracy and network society. To some scholars, global civil societies can be seen as conducive to democracy (e.g. Anheier, et al., 2005). Studies also illustrate that global civil society also goes hand in hand with global network society not only through facilitation of communication and participation through the Internet but the very ideas at the core of civil society (a society that is open and participatory) is very much in tune with network society (a society that is less hierarchical, less bureaucratic, open and inclusive) (e.g. Warkentin, 2001). Likewise, democracy and network society are conducive to the support of each other if not seen to be reinforcing one another. Democratic participation can be facilitated through multiple connections which ensure informed and interactive politics (Sey and Castells, 2004: 363). Wainwright suggests that a new relationship between civil society and democracy is being forged at the international level, where there is a new impetus to build organisations of civil society as a force for achieving and deepening democracy or rebuilding it in a radically new context (Wainwright, 2005).

Therefore, an understanding of the mutually reinforcing links between global civil society, network society and democracy can be presented below.

Scheme 1. Relationship between Global Civil Society, Democracy and Network Society: Mutually reinforcing links

But how did this mutually reinforcing relationship evolve historically? What conjunctive circumstances led to the establishment of these relationships? These are empirical questions that need addressing. As Sey and Castell (2004: 364) declared, the answer to this kind of question "*has to be established by observation, not proclaimed as fate*". This injunction resonates with Wainwright who states that to study civil society,

> "…is not to defend some abstract or universal connection between civil society and democracy. Rather … an analysis of democracy which points to civil society as a potential source of power for democracy … through several <u>examples</u> –<u>some positive</u>, <u>some negative</u>– the condition under which, and the ways in which, this potential is realised." (Wainwright, 2005: 94-95, our emphasis)

We try to answer this question by looking at an instance of abrupt and bloody regime change from authoritarianism to democracy and examining the roles of global and local civil society, which are embedded in a network society.

We take Indonesia as a case study for two main reasons. Not only has Indonesia experienced a heightened and bloody transition to democracy in 1998 (Bird, 1999), but also various civil society organisations (CSOs) in Indonesia had started networking with their international partners and thus were already embedded in a network society when the political upheaval took place (Uhlin, 2000)[1]. Some scholars have employed the network perspective to determine how it can be used to portray projects undertaken by civil society, amongst which the promotion of democracy seems to be the major agenda item. This is done through coalition building (Diani, 1990, Lim, 2002, 2003, Rucht, 1989) and building opposition, e.g. through establishing collaboration, publishing and campaigning, mobilization and observation like watchdog activities (Camacho, 2001, Surman and Reilly, 2003, Warkentin, 2001). We also note the importance of the network perspective to foster social movement as networks link a multiplicity of actors, which is necessary for, amongst other things, facilitating democratisation (Anheier, 2003, Uhlin, 2000).

We consider it important to study the dynamics of civil society from the social network perspective. Referring to the Scheme 1 illustration, the purpose of this paper is to answer questions such as were there differentiated roles for global civil society during the different periods of democratic change? More specifically, what was the role of global civil society during the period? The focus of our investigation will, however, be limited to the periods of the heightened transition to democracy in Indonesia.

After briefly examining the focus of this study here, in section 2 we elaborate the links between global civil society, network society and democracy and present the political context in Indonesia. Then, we present the triangulation of methods we use in this study consisting of survey, social network analyses (SNA) and in-depth interviews with activists and networkers. In section 4 we elaborate the findings of the study and we discuss them in more depth in section 5. Section 6 concludes the study.

2. Global civil society, democracy and network society

2.1. A mutually reinforcing links?

Recalling Scheme 1, we discuss how the links between global civil society, network society and democracy are seen in the literature as mutually reinforcing. However, we begin by noting that such relationships may also be problematic.

First, Edwards and Hulme, for example, argue that accountability is the most notable problem concerning the performance of civil society organisations in relation to their donors and beneficiaries (1995). This problematic emerges as a result of a dilemma between the nature of work the CSOs do and the context in which they do it. Most civil society groups operate in a world where standard criteria for qualitative achievement and organisational achievement are lacking. Both need to be obtained through negotiation with legitimate stakeholders (Edwards and Hulme, 1995, 1997).

Second, to Fung and Wright (2001), substantive democracy as a way of organising the state has been narrowly identified with aspects of procedural democracy such as elections for legislative and executive offices. This causes ineffectiveness in accomplishing the central ideals of democratic politics, that is facilitating political involvement of the citizen, forging political consensus through dialogue, devising and implementing public policies that "... *ground a productive economy and healthy society, and in more radical egalitarian version of the democratic ideal, ensuring that all citizen benefit from the nation's wealth.*" (p.5)

Lastly, the emergence of the network society is associated with various acute tensions (Silverstone, 1996). The realisation of the network society has enabled and increased mobility and reach in our everyday life. Yet it is not without its problems. There are those who argue

that the network society has contributed to an undermining of a sense of home and place; creating a new kind of rootlessness because of its capacity to unlock and disconnect individuals from their dependence on place, increasing social isolation and cultural fragmentation. Others also argue the reverse: network society will continue to liberate our domesticity from its dependence on physical location and enhance social and cultural freedoms by enabling us to create our own distinct and meaningful identities (Silverstone, 1996: 223). This debate goes to the heart of the essential tensions that lie at the centre of the network society: tension between security and insecurity, participation and isolation, freedom and control.

Having acknowledged these problems and tensions we examine predominant views about the links between global civil society, network society and democracy.

On the link between global civil society and democracy. Global civil society is conducive to democracy. Kaldor et al. (2004) provide an example.

> "The last two decades have witnessed the fall of Communist regimes and the spread of democracy… This phenomenon, it can be argued, is linked to globalisation and, indeed, to global civil society… Pressure for democratisation has been partly a result of pressures from above; international financial institutions, outside governments, and international donors have demanded political reform alongside market reform. More importantly, pressure for democratisation has come from below, from civil society groups that have been able to expand the space for their activities through links with the outside world." (p. 13)

This argument echoes Wainwright's idea that civil society is not simply a 'sphere', but a source of power for democratic change in new, more international forms, which conveys an awareness of civil society as a source of power, including power to bring about political change (2005). The relationship between civil society and democracy is being formed at the global level, where the momentum to establish organisations of civil society to achieve democracy has an entirely new context (Wainwright, 2005: 100-101). It seems obvious that in this case the *raison d'etre* of global civil society organisations is in fact the extension of the achievement of democracy.

On the relationship between global civil society and network society. Studies suggest that the emergence of global civil society is inseparable from network society. First, it is because the idea at the core of civil society is much in tune with network society (e.g. Warkentin, 2001). Based on the study of the social movements network of global justice issue, Juris (2004) for example, argues that networks are increasingly associated with values related to grassroots participatory democracy and thus have become a powerful cultural ideal. Particularly among civil society groups, networks have become a guiding logic that provides both a model of and a model for emerging forms of directly democratic politics on local to global scales (p.342). Secondly, this idea has become possible because of the facilitation of new information and communication technology (ICT)[2]. ICT has strengthened the link between civil society and network society while network society contributes to the technology's growth and helps shape the direction of its development in particular ways. ICT provides both opportunities and constraints for actors participating in global civil society – in some ways expanding and in other ways contracting available means for interacting (Warkentin, 2001).

On the link between democracy and network society. Scholars have long argued that democracy and network society are seen to be reinforcing one another. Historically, democracy meant having selected an élite of political representatives in political discussions. Then, having 'direct' democracy by involving the citizen in the decision making process became the ideal. With the help of ICT this ideal has become possible today although still

considered problematic (Coleman, 1999). The rise of the network society characterised by the appropriation of ICT has provided a renewed support for this vision, as Richard (1999) puts:

> "The vision of leaders and their governments actively working in collaboration with citizens and interest groups towards measurable goals is prominent in Internet related discourse. This ideal may come from the fact that the Internet blends tools for public participation and representation in a unique way" (p.71)

It is clear that democratic participation can manifest via manifold relations within network society and thus ensures informed and interactive politics. Sey and Castells (2004) investigate the emerging interaction between people and democracy in the process of political representation in the new form of networked public space constituted by the Internet.

2.2. Civil society and democracy: Universal or particular connection?

Civil society is a relatively new concept and academics are still grasping it. Loosely yet operationally defined (e.g. Anheier, et al., 2005), civil society is understood as a sphere of ideas, values, different kinds of groups with some degree of autonomy in relation to the state, economic entities and the family. Groups in this sphere develop identities, articulate interests and try to promote a specific political agenda. It is no surprise that much research on civil society and democratisation have used civil society as a variable explaining the democratisation of formal political institutions. The literatures are rich in hypotheses and more or less well grounded in empirical findings about the relationship between civil society and democracy. Wainwright, for instance, notes the contingent nature of links between civil society and democracy, which implies the possibility of links between civil society and democracy to be severed (Wainwright, 2005):

> "In western and eastern Europe, the last 30 years have seen both the high point of this connection and, more recently, its almost complete severance. The high point of connection between civil society and democracy included the emergence in the 1970s in western Europe of sustained social movements rooted in civil society, and in the 1980s in the east the dissident networks building up to the "Velvet Revolution" of Wenceslas Square in Prague and the fall of the Berlin Wall. A common feature of both these contexts was a conception of civil society not simply as a 'sphere' but as a source of power for democratic change." (p.96)

Acknowledging the Tocquevillean view about civil society as a protection against abuses of state power, she finds that the thinking and the activity of the 1980s networks in central and eastern Europe already went beyond classical understandings of the relation between civil society and democracy. It reinforces the idea of a spillover from democratic initiatives in civil society to the democratisation of political power (Wainwright, 2005)[3]. But is this relation universal? If developments within civil society are related to processes of democratisation, we may suggest that global civil society has important implications for theories of democratisation too. Democracy has been closely related to the nation state in most conventional analysis. However, global civil society offers a new political sphere for efforts at democratisation and raises the question of possible forms of democracy on a global level.

We limit the discussion to the important aspects of the role of civil society, more particularly the relation between local and global civil society under an authoritarian regime and in the transition to democracy in the Indonesian context. We follow on from Wainwright's suggestion by elaborating on different periods where these links are severed or strengthened.

2.3. Transition to democracy in Indonesia: Periods and context

There are four significant, distinct periods relevant to the transition to democracy in Indonesia.

2.3.1 Pre 1995: Authoritarian period

From 1965 until May 1998, General Soeharto led Indonesia in a highly authoritarian way and called his leadership period the 'New Order', to distinguish from the 'Old Order' led by the former President Soekarno. The New Order regime was dominated by the military and was able to resist pressure for democratisation. There were conflicts in the political élites and the military, but these were factional and easily controlled and manipulated by Soeharto. The regime was extremely powerful and became relatively autonomous in relation to society (Uhlin, 2000). Due to its position in the global capitalist system and anti-Communist ideology, the regime received substantial economic, military and political support from the West. Until the mid 1990s, the world saw Indonesia as a politically stable state with an impressive record of economic growth, which qualified it as one of the 'tiger economies' in Asia. As a result, this is the first period where civil society was weak, depoliticised and fragmented (Hill, 2000).

2.3.2. 1995 – 1998: Bloody transformation

From the middle of the 1990s civil society started expressing its discontent more openly. A new generation of advocacy groups, mainly pro-democracy and human rights groups, were formed and became increasingly active in anti-government protests. These groups were characterised by their attempts to unite all forms of pro-democracy movements and increase pressure against the government, including establishing alliances with peasants and workers (Uhlin, 1997: 110-114). Women's movements became more prominent in organising themselves and expressing their concern on the economic crisis that hit countries in South East Asia in 1997. Some women's groups promoted domestic issues (like milk and food scarcity) in national, political, economic debates and raised women's awareness more widely. By doing so, they contributed to the process of democratisation (Kalibonso, 1999). Other developmentalist and professional civil society groups also started organising themselves and spread political awareness among their beneficiaries including farmers and urban workers. As a result a wide spectrum of civilians academics, civil servants and street vendors, joined hand-in-hand expressing concern and protesting to the government. Ordinary workers, who were often pictured by the media as 'ignorant' and 'opportunistic', also actively organised themselves and were directly involved in the street protests (Prasetyantoko, 2000).

The beginning of the end of Soeharto's 36 years of authoritarian government in Indonesia was actually initiated by the Asian economic crisis that began in Thailand in 1997. When the crisis hit Indonesia and the regime could hardly retain its power, students pioneered and led mass demonstrations and demanded the President's resignation. Student activism has always played an important role in Indonesian politics (Aspinall, 1995). In 1997 scores of CSOs also joined in with the students giving support to the movement. After a short and bloody period which cost the lives of students who protested in the streets, accounts of missing activists who were protesting the government's policies, thousands of people dead in mass riots, many reports of women raped and vast material destruction[4], on 21 May 1998 Soeharto, who was eventually abandoned by the military, was forced to step down. His 36 years of administration had come to an end and 1998 saw a historical moment when Indonesia entered a period from authoritarian rule to democracy.

2.3.3. 1999 – 2002: Fraught euphoria

His successor Prof. Dr. B.J. Habbibie, under both international and national pressure, introduced some political reforms and revived political activities that had been stifled for more than three decades: some political prisoners were released, free elections were promised and a referendum took place in East Timor, which led to East Timor's independence.

Almost at a stroke political space in Indonesia was considerably widened. Yet, because it was sudden and massive, its effect was euphoric for most of the people in the country. Farmer organisations and trade unions became radicalised, underground organisations came to the

surface and joined hands with the newly formed civil society groups and organisations (Hadiz, 1998, Silvey, 2003). Hundreds of new political organisations and political parties were formed and the media became much more independent and critical of the government. But the transition was not entirely painless. In 1999 Habibie called for a parliamentary election after widespread social unrest. Massive student led protests for greater democracy in Jakarta turned violent after a harsh military crackdown on demonstrators killed at least five students and two others. Rioting spread as demonstrators burned shops and cars across the capital city. At least 16 were killed over a period of several days (Ito, 1999).

After the first free election in 1999 which was surprisingly peaceful, Dr. Abdurrahman Wahid was elected by the People's Assembly to become the 4th president of Indonesia. During his two-year presidency many new 'liberating' policies were introduced, although some were regarded as 'controversial'. These policies overturned old discriminative policies which had been in place under Soeharto's and Habbibie's regimes.

After further political turmoil in 2001, which led to the impeachment of Abdurrahman Wahid, the vice president Megawati Soekarnoputri became President. She remained in power until she lost the 2004 election which was won by ex-general SB Yudhoyono and who remains in power today. This third period (1999-2002) was obviously marked with relatively chaotic political change due to the euphoric reaction after the displacement of the authoritarian leader.

2.3.4. *2003 – after: Towards stability*

The political situation seems to have 'settled down' from 2003 onwards. During 2003 preparations for the election 2004 were made, which took the reform process further through extending the range of publicly elected positions. For the first time voters directly elected the President and Vice-president. They also elected representatives to the newly established House of Regional Representatives. These elections were the first in the history of Indonesia in which there was no government appointed member of parliament. In addition, the election system itself had been reformed: voters were able to identify their preferred candidate from the party lists, the electoral districts had been reduced in the hope of fostering more direct linkages between members of the Parliament and their respective constituents (Undp, 2004). Despite worries from pro-democracy civil groups about President Yudhoyono whose background was in the military, as a nation, Indonesia has begun to show an evolving political maturity.

This period, which significantly differs from the previous period of euphoria, seems to have marked a new era in the democratisation process in Indonesia. Civil society groups, who have been important actors throughout the previous two periods, now have a wider sphere to act as a 'check-and-balance' for both government and business. They actively address various concerns and issues in order to advocate people's rights, to protect their environment and to develop their livelihoods and thus bring about social change in many aspects. Some groups try to do so by influencing governmental policies, promoting ethics and accountability, building public opinion and providing alternative medias. In terms of concerns and issues, civil society is characterised as more diverse compared to its identity during the authoritarian regime.

During the four periods, actors within civil society have undoubtedly played a very important role in the transition to democracy in Indonesia. This is despite a claim that civil society in itself is neither strong nor pluralistic (Uhlin, 2000). An Indonesian scholar has written an important note; that the extent to which these civil society groups succeed or fail in achieving their missions and goals depends not only on their own capacity to organise but also on the social and political context in which they operate (Hadiwinata, 2003: 36).

3. Methods

We map the international network of CSOs in Indonesia during the heightened periods around transition to democracy. We use triangulation methods or combined quantitative and qualitative approaches (Gilbert, 1992), which involves a complex research design, usually with stages of research that may iterate (Danermark, et al., 2002), such as our case. Triangulation may enable better measurement and may also reveal differences of interpretation and meaning (Olsen, 2003).

Survey and social network analysis (SNA) were performed to provide a broad picture of the Indonesian CSOs and their networks. In-depth interviews were then carried out to gain more detailed and specific information. Combining the methods, we expect to reach a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon.

3.1. Survey

The survey was designed for two purposes: to capture the nature of Indonesian CSOs with regards to their typology (i.e. size, nature of organisation, main issues and concerns and activities) and to identify the social networks of the respondents (by asking with which organisations or networks they ever link) over periods of time.

In the main section of the survey asking about the network, we asked: "*Dengan jaringan/organisasi internasional mana saja di bawah ini organisasi Anda menjalin hubungan?*" which literally means, "With which international organisations listed below has your organisation established a link?" Respondents were to pick from a list of 34 international organisations (both donors and active organisations) known to have worked with Indonesian CSOs along with the period they established the link. There was space for respondents to name organisations they have linked with but which are not listed. The meaning of 'link' will be discussed later in Section 4.2. because it has a connotative meaning among Indonesian CSOs.

The survey used *Bahasa Indonesia* as the command language and was designed to meet criteria such as simple language (i.e. speaking in common tongues, having reasonably short but clear questions, properly dealing with avoidable confusions) and using common concepts and manageable tasks (Converse and Presser, 1986). Most of the questions were closed or semi closed and we also let CSOs leave a 'no response' if they found the questions were too sensitive or made them feel insecure in giving such information. The survey was targeted at the whole country and undertaken in two different modes, i.e. electronic and postal. The electronic survey included an automated form sent as an email attachment and an online survey application that enabled respondents with reasonably high-speed internet access to participate in real time[5]. The target population were the CSOs listed in the four publicly available CSO directories (i.e. SMERU, TIFA, LP3ES and CRS). In total, the survey was sent to 957 CSOs (552 electronically and 405 by postal)[6] and was responded to by 254 (26.8%) organisations during 15 November 2005 – 15 January 2006. What we lack in breadth in this survey, we make up for in depth in the interviews[7].

3.2. Social Network Analysis

We analysed network data using Pajek (Batagelj and Mrvar, 2003) version 1.10. A particular section of the survey has been designed to capture the temporal network of the respondent organisations with their international partners. The inputs provided by respondents were then converted into nodes and edges to be fed into Pajek. We generated a visual representation of how networks of Indonesian CSOs with their international partners have grown over time and put this into the socio-political context, i.e. periodisation of political change as above. We have a sequence of temporal networks in four different periods which reflect the dynamics of the links between Indonesian CSOs and their international partners.

3.3. Network dynamics

We discuss some methods where networks and temporality are linked.

3.3.1. Agent based modelling

Agent based modelling (Axelrod, 1997, Epstein and Axtell, 1996) is an evolutionary framework to study a wide range of phenomena using computer simulation. It is an *in-silico* laboratory (Epstein and Axtell, 1996) which is used to recreate stylized facts of dynamics of networks observable outside the laboratory, for instance, preferential attraction in author's collaboration networks. At its heart the simulation consists of agents interacting with each other, the environments in which agents operate and in which they also interact, and rules of these interactions.

3.3.2. Sequence Analysis of Network Positions

From a completely different origin, inter-organisational networks observed at a particular time register for each node a particular position in network. For instance, at the beginning of the observation an individual organisation is not connected to any other organisation, i.e. its position is an *isolate* (this is in contrast with other organisations which connect with many others, i.e. its position is a *core*). Over time this organisation may make a connection with other organisations and by virtue of its recent connection it may find itself positioned near the centre of the network. Later, the network position of the same organisation may change due to different reasons. What we have here is a sequence of network positions for an organisation. It is not difficult to extend this exercise to all organisations in the original network and collect sequences of positions. We then have a collection of views of how the network unfolds in the eyes of the organisation over time. Equivalently we have network careers of each organisation over time. To this collection of sequences, one can apply sequence analysis (Abbott, 1990) to conduct a kind of historiography to uncover typical or dominant careers. The prevalence of dominant careers or their absence could then be related to wider events affecting the networks.

Our choice of methods in analysing temporality and networks is by making use of a sequence of network visuals to understand or highlight changes in terms of increasing numbers of organisations and increasing intensity of involvement over time. Additionally, as evidence to examine our synthesis we present the statistics of network density.

3.3. Interviews

Interviews are to validate and provide additional support and also acquire in-depth insights about the different roles of networks in different periods. Interviews were arranged with 31 Indonesian CSO leaders or senior activists purposively sampled from the combination between their nature of activities (advocacy v. developmentalists) and organisational structure (formal/centralised v. informal/networked). Interviews were mostly carried out over the telephone for about 90 minutes on average (ranging from 45 minutes to 120 minutes), recorded and transcribed for analysis using Atlas.ti.

Interviews were carried out in *Bahasa Indonesia* and as with the survey, the interview was designed to use simple language, common concepts and manageable tasks as cues in order to help informants to provide as detailed information as possible for the study (Converse and Presser, 1986). In addition to the interview design, we asked permission for the interviews to be recorded. Having understood the complex nature of CSOs we also allowed the interviewees to exclude certain parts of the interview from the recording, especially when it concerned parts that were regarded as 'sensitive' by the informants.

4. Results

4.1. Indonesian CSOs engaging with network society

Indonesian CSOs have become more in-tune with and embracing of global ideas. Issues including democratisation, good governance, human rights, gender equality and women's rights, amongst others are blended together with the more general, localised concerns of empowerment, education, environment, development, poverty eradication, justice and peace. These are issues similarly embraced and fought for by CSOs all over the world (Anheier, et al., 2005). We also find that in terms of activities, Indonesian CSOs are building their capacity to undertake training, research including consultancy works and publication including dissemination of ideas, advocating victims, mass mobilisation and lobbying, all in relatively equal proportions. These have all been made possible thanks to ICT, particularly Internet-based computer-mediated-communication (CMC)[8].

We also identify several strategic areas for Indonesian CSOs to benefit from their engagement with the network society. The five most strategic areas we find are: public opinion building, alternative media, coalition building with other organisations, advocacy and social empowerment. The rest are the promotion of global justice, poverty eradication, promotion of pluralism and diversity, promotion of environment sustainability, mass mobilisation, building political opposition, and improving livelihood.

4.2. *Kerja bersama*: understanding links between Indonesian CSOs

To accurately picture the network of Indonesian CSOs, we asked our respondents whether they 'link' with other organisations (see Section 3.1). But, what do these links mean? Traditional network study usually creates a single meaning for a link in a network, whether it is an arch or an edge, such as an email sent from a node to other node, a visit, a telephone call, collaboration, etc. However, imposing such notions would be impossible in our study due to the complexity of CSO activities. For example, knowing another CSO does not necessarily mean having a link. Also when a link is there, it does not have only a single meaning. Rather, it may mean more than that. It includes working together in a campaign, joining in the same mailing list, undertaking a project together, engaging in collaboration, receiving money, exchanging activities, amongst other things. A respondent in our study put it thus,

> "It is not easy to say [whom] we have networked with. We may know each other, meet or even to be together in an event, but it does not [obviously] mean we have a network with each other. We consider other organisations as our network if we have engaged in a work-together ('kerja bersama'). And usually it is intensive. And long enough. And they are various [in terms of form]. [But] clearly [a network is] not only knowing or contacting each other." (Interview with a male activist, national political CSO, based in Jakarta, 6 January 2006)

We follow Mohr's suggestion on allowing the subjects to speak as closely as possible to their own practice or everyday use (Mohr, 1998) and then we only capture this as a node or a link. We consequently avoid early imposition of network ideas and concepts. In our networks here, links are understood as '*kerja bersama*' which may not correspond accurately to its dictionary meaning.

It is this notion of '*kerja bersama*', which is widely and commonly understood by CSOs who participated in our study, that we asked them about their network. We address our question to ask what other organisations they have established links with to form a network. In other words, we ask them with what other CSOs (in this study: international CSOs) they have engaged in "kerja bersama" over the different periods. These links make up our networks.

4.3.   Network maps: Dynamics over periods

Using Pajek, we generate the map of the international network of Indonesian CSO, which identifies the links between Indonesian CSOs with their international partners.

As pictured below, the international network of Indonesian CSOs grew during the four periods. We characterise in terms of number of organisations, density (or average connection/link within the network) and k-core. The latter gives an idea of cohesiveness, or more accurately clique-ishness, of the network. For a network of size *n*, the maximum k-core is n-1, which means everyone is connected to everyone else or a clique. The higher maximum k-core means the more cliqueish the network is (or more cohesive).

Before 1995: *under authoritarian*	*1995-1998:* *bloody transformation*	*1999-2002:* *fraught euphoria*	*2003-after:* *towards stability*
N = 350 *k-core = 3* *Density = 0.0021*	*N = 350* *k-core = 3* *Density = 0.0027*	*N = 350* *k-core = 5* *Density = 0.0064*	*N = 350* *k-core = 6* *Density = 0.0092*

Table 2 . Dynamics of the international network of Indonesian CSOs

We can see that the international networks of Indonesian CSOs are becoming more cohesive from time-to time (indicated by the increasing *k-core*). We can also see that the density of networks increase over the identified periods with a significant rise in the dynamics after the bloody transformation: the first two periods are similarly less active and the last two periods are similarly more active. In other words, there was a marked increase of global civil society activity between the periods of bloody transformation to fraught euphoria.

5.   Discussion: Decomposing network dynamics and clarifying the links between global civil society and democracy

As is widely known, global civil society involvement can be classified as donor (providing direct financial support) and direct activism (involvement in coordinating meeting, planning, sending people, etc.) (Anheier, 2003, Edwards and Hulme, 1997). In the context of this study, we took the term of '*kerja bersama'* to capture the latter, as have been clearly noted above. To one of our informants,

> "'Kerja-bersama' can be from funding, campaigning, into concrete/real work in the field. Usually [if we receive] money is also included. It is also 'kerja bersama'. But we also do a lot of 'kerja bersama' with other organisations, both local/national and international. That is what we call networking. If [there is] 'kerja bersama' then [there is] a network. Otherwise, there is no network. That is why we can engage in different 'kerja bersama' with different organisations from time to time." (Interview with a male activist, national political CSO, based in Jakarta, 6 January 2006)

'Kerja bersama' thus includes all activities implying *real action* including campaigning, coordination, collaboration, fund raising, other exchange activities, capacity building, etc. Consequently these links exclude activities *without real action* such as attending the same event, knowing each other, being in the same mailing list but without any real output. We

adopt this analysis to ensure that we understand what this involvement looks like in more detail.

Table 1 shows that during the authoritarian period, some local, active CSOs have started building their international network. During the bloody transformation period, surprisingly, the network does not seem to grow significantly. After the bloody transformation period, the network grows very significantly. The end of authoritarian regime may have given new impetus for more involvement of the global CSO with national politics. Various global CSOs from mostly developed countries paid close attention to the Indonesian situation and were willing to establish networks with Indonesian CSOs. From 2003 up to the present time, the international networks appear to be more stable. Visually, we can see that the first two periods are distinct from the last two as also confirmed by the density measure. There is clearly a significant change in the network dynamics from the bloody transformation period (1995-1998) to fraught euphoria (1999-2002).

What we have here is an indication before and after the regime change. We want to know how real this effect is by breaking down network dynamics in terms of the involvement of donor vs. active participants international CSOs. We breakdown the networks into (i) networks with international *donor* (in which Indonesian CSOs mainly or mostly receive financial support only) and (ii) networks with international active civil society groups (in which Indonesian CSOs mainly work together in certain issues or concerns, in addition to some financial support in some cases).

The networks between Indonesian CSOs and international donors are depicted below.

Before 1995: under authoritarian	1995-1998: bloody transformation	1999-2002: fraught euphoria	2003-after: towards stability
N = 181 k-core = 3 Density = 0.0039	N = 181 k-core = 3 Density = 0.0053	N = 181 k-core = 4 Density = 0.0136	N = 181 k-core = 5 Density = 0.0160

Table 2. Dynamics of the networks of Indonesian CSOs with international donor

The donor links during the first two periods are similar and again similar in the last two periods (see Table 2). Yet we notice a notable increase that takes place between the second (bloody transformation) and the third (fraught euphoria) period. The density measures suggest that the change is quite significant, i.e. 0.0053 to 0.0136.

The networks of Indonesian CSOs with their international active counterparts are mapped below.

Before 1995: under authoritarian	1995-1998: bloody transformation	1999-2002: fraught euphoria	2003-after: towards stability
N = 275 k-core = 2 Density = 0.0017	N = 275 k-core = 2 Density = 0.0022	N = 275 k-core = 3 Density = 0.0046	N = 275 k-core = 4 Density = 0.0081

Table 3. Dynamics of the networks of Indonesian CSOs with international CSOs (counterpart)

We see can see clearly the marked increase (see Table 3) in the networks with active counterparts: there is a real involvement but with a distinctly different intensity in the different periods. In the first two periods, the networks are sparse and after the bloody transformation period, they grow significantly. Yet, the density measures indicate a less sharp increase.

To have an overall picture, we depict the density of all sets of networks over all four periods below.


Figure 1. Density of networks over periods

The graph shows that the increase in the density of the networks after the period 1995-1998 is mostly affected by the increase in the links with donors rather than the links with active global

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civil society. In other words, the increasing activity of Indonesian CSOs after regime change is much more a result of the increase of their relationships with international donors rather than real participation with global CSOs. This evidence strongly suggests that some forms of chequebook activism explain the observed involvement of the global CSOs during the various periods. What we learned is that, once again, an incident that global civil society has missed is an opportunity to actively play its role to foster democratisation in Indonesia during the important transition, particularly in the turbulent years[9].

Deriving from what we discuss in section 2.2., we consequently propose two alternative roles of the global civil society during the period of democratisation: as initiator and as responsive counterpart. In the initiator role, global civil society tends to be involved in networks which are dense during both the pre-transformation and the transformation period. During the post transformation period, it matters less whether the network is dense. Furthermore, we expect that the shape of networks during the first two periods is quite similar; we expect a high degree of network correlation between pre-transformation and transformation periods and perhaps less network correlation between the transformation and post-transformation period. Global civil society as the responsive participant would be consistent with a network that is relatively sparse during pre-transformation and significantly denser during transformation. The latter is the result of being responsive to the change that is taking place. Furthermore we expect a low degree of network correlation between the two periods and perhaps a higher degree of correlation during transformation and post-transformation periods. We try to characterise our expectation in terms of network density and shape correlation to give a more precise handle on the empirical evidence.

However, this study does not confirm such roles of global civil society in Indonesia during the transition period. Instead, we see an incident that global civil society has missed an opportunity to actively play its role during the acute transformation period. Scholars have argued that the involvement of global civil society in Indonesia had started in the 1970s. The support from global civil society for democratic change in Indonesia is nothing new and has a considerable impact on the ideas and actions of the pro-democracy movement (Uhlin, 2000). Uhlin however, does not clarify the sense in which the impacts are felt or taken up by the local civil society. We demonstrate here, that the impact or the networks are different *depending on the period*. The link between global civil society, network society and democracy in Indonesia in the political upheaval cannot just be taken for granted: they are not equally important. Instead, it is the link between network society (in this case Indonesian CSOs) and democracy which is the important link to explain and to bring about the change: in other words to animate the scheme.

6.   Conclusion

We demonstrate that the global civil society during the period under study displayed modes of activism that could be characterised as chequebook activism. It did not recognise the incipient democratic change and failed to take the opportunity and play its role in fostering democratisation in Indonesia. This case resonates with other examples of a problematic relationship of global civil society and democracy (in the case of Guatemala, see Wainwright, 2005). We, of course, recognise the possibility of organisations that do not fit this role and that have stood by their Indonesian counterparts through the difficult years. However, our evidence show that on the whole they could be said to have missed a great opportunity.

One limitation of the study arises from its reliance on the perceptions and activities of CSOs in Indonesia. One can argue that the picture and the argument may be very different had the international CSOs also been consulted. Their role and mode of activism may be interpreted significantly differently. However, we disagree with this position. Fundamentally, even if it were to be the case that international CSOs were active throughout the period of this study,

their activism obviously was not recognised as such by those activists on the streets during the turbulent years. Even on reflection many years later, the participants still fail to recognise this alternative position. Therefore, if we accept this alternative position of more activism on the part of international CSOs, the evidence points to their failure to translate more activisms into real actions that is understood by their Indonesian counterpart.

The triangulation methods we apply here are essential in systematically probing and understanding the links and the dynamics between global civil society, network society and democracy. Our argument about the role of international CSOs would not have been as clear yet complex if it were not for the rich meaning attached by our respondents to each link in the network. The meaning of each link can only be captured using complementary methods and hence different from, traditional social network methods. Likewise, the limited and different kind of material gathered during the interviews is significantly enriched by the application of social network methods. It is in the combination and conversation across methods, in short triangulation, that have allowed us to probe the issues deeper and wider. This triangulation could potentially be a practical tool in understanding other incidences.

Having demonstrated the fruitfulness of our scheme in this case, we point out the potential of applying this scheme to look at the relationship between global civil society, network society and other global issues in a more detail. It may be used to look at the dynamics of networks and the emergence of issues[10]. This scheme is also flexible enough to allow for the possibility of other actors and factors to be included. For instance, the state could also be included, say in the analysis of issues such as free trade or intellectual property rights. Another example might be the inclusion of exogenous shock such as financial crises which precipitates deep-seated change. The case studied here can of course be enriched by inclusion of this factor, however this is the subject of another paper (*).

Reference is available upon request.

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[1] Indeed, there has been debate among scholars on the issue as to which actors significantly drove the political change in Indonesia. Mietzner (1999) argues that it was the political élite and the military, whereas Bourchier (1999) argues that the civil society was the significant actor. Both agree, however, that the political circumstances during the transition period to democracy were abrupt and intense. Obviously, an interaction between civil society (in the forms of public protests organised by many civil society groups and organisations) and the political élite and military (who then split and led to the resignation of President Soeharto) led to the fateful change. We agree with Uhlin (2000: 11) that the split between the élite and the military would have never happened if there had not been such strong pressure from civil society. Such pressure would also not have been effective had the civil society, involved in promoting democracy, not been well embedded and networked. Naturally there were many other factors operating, but we believe that one of the most important is the network, which enabled them to put pressure towards, and thus promoted, changes in society (Diani, 2003).

[2] Warkentin (2001) points out that it is through the facilitation in communication and participation via ICT that a network society is formed and thus strengthens global civil society. He suggests,

> "Because the Internet's inherent characteristics and transnational reach parallel (or correspond to) those of global civil society, the medium serves as both a logical and an effective tool for establishing and maintaining social connections that can contribute to global civil society… By increasing the ease with which people can establish and maintain relationships, share resources and information, and coordinate their activities, the Internet aids the process of building and maintaining the social bases of global civil society." (p.33)

[3] Wainwright reveals that dissident networks composed of civil society had moved from a defensive role to something more proactive, that is an agency for change with an emphasis on self organisation, mutual support and autonomy, which became a de facto challenge to authority (Wainwright, 2005).

6 There were 946 CSOs whose email addresses were listed in the four directories and they were *all* invited to the electronic survey, of which, 394 email invitations were bounced back due to unreachable addresses. Of all CSOs listed without email addresses, 50% (790) were invited to undertake the postal survey and only 384 postal invitations were returned due to unreachable addressee.

7 The response rate of 26.8% seems disheartening at first but we are encouraged by three facts. First, given that the concept of civil society is still very much debated, it is understandable that CSOs are still elusive. Therefore a census of CSOs or a register of CSOs in both developed and developing countries is practically non-existent (for and attempt, see "Global Civil Society" series (Anheier, et al., 2005)). A census or register is of course a major factor in a successful, high response survey. We used the best available registers to hand and are satisfied with the nominal response of 254. Second, very few existing figures are available on response rate and nominal response for on-line surveys in developing countries. This low response rate could be the result of inadequate infrastructure (compared to developed countries) combined with the relative novelty of the online survey among CSOs (even in developed countries). We are not aware of many high response on-line surveys due to, for instance, the use of broadcast surveys. We believe the nominal response we have is respectable in this regard. Third, we applied mixed-methods in this study including interviews with activists from the respondent CSOs. In effect, what we lack in breadth, we more than make up for in depth. We conducted extensive interviews with 31 respondents, ranging from 45 minutes to 120 minutes and averaging 75 minutes. They are located in different positions in the networks in order for us to capture the depth of meaning these networks hold for them.

8 How do the Indonesian CSOs engage in the network society? Thanks to ICT particularly Internet-based computer mediated communication (CMC) available to them (97.83%), they found that their networks with their partner organisations are growing significantly, both nationally and internationally. Although most of the CSOs only use basic CMC like email (and mailing lists) due to poor communication infrastructure (43.48% connect through dial-up, 15% through tele-centre or other organisation and the rest through low-speed broadband), they are able to organise activities including networking, coalition coordination, public opinion building and even collective campaigning and in some cases influencing state's policies. Engaging with the network society has also particularly been helpful for the Indonesian CSOs so that their aims and activities have become more focused and their perspective towards issues widened. Most of them believe that having been part of the network society has enabled them to widen their own perspective to the global level (88.37%) and expand their network (80.00%), both with other national CSOs and global CSO partners. Overall, taking part actively in the networked society has facilitated achievement of their mission and goals and thus foster a further democratisation. Yet these organisations are also aware of the negative impact of this new communication technology affecting their organisational performances, from threats like virus and 'spam' massages to apparent time wasting because of these distractions.

9 We also analysed graph correlations between adjacent periods using quadratic assignment procedure (QAP), a variant of a permutation test for networks (Krackhardt, 1987) to deal with dependency inherent in network data. The results reinforce our conclusion. It is available from the authors upon request

10 Wainwright (ibid.), for example recognises the increasing salience of global issues. However, it is not obvious in her exposition how an issue becomes global or how the local attach or reinforces the global. There is a sense in which her exposition assumes a trickle down effect of global issues; they seep down to dominate or to invite participation of local CSOs. It is entirely plausible however, that local issues were picked up by actors connected to the global CSOs and amplify them. In this case, the local issues become the source of global conscience or global understanding. It is quite possible to capture this process using the scheme above where local issues enter the scheme by first linking with local CSOs.